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abstraCt
We classify the strategies by which management consultancies can create and sustain 
the institutional capital that makes it possible for them to extract competitive resources 
from their institutional context. Using examples from the german consulting industry, we 
show how localized competitive actions can enhance both individual firms’ positions, and 
also strengthen the collective institutional capital of the consulting industry thus legiti-
mizing consulting services in broader sectors of society and facilitating access to requi-
site resources. Our findings counter the image of institutional entrepreneurship as indi-
vidualistic, “heroic” action. We demonstrate how distributed, embedded actors can col-
lectively shape the institutional context from within to enhance their institutional capital. 
JeL-Classification: a1, L1, L84, M1.
Keywords: Consulting industry; embedded agency; institutional Capital; institutional 
Strategy; neoinstitutionalism.
1 introduCtion
In our increasingly knowledge-intensive and dynamic economies management consultan-
cies have gained strong economic and social influence as the new “market protagonists” 
(Faust (2002)). The largest consultancies rival multinational corporations in turnover and 
employment (Empson (2007b); Greenwood, Suddaby, and McDougald (2006b)) and serve 
clients in business, politics, and nonprofit sectors (Niejahr and Bittner (2004)). As exemplars 
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of knowledge-intensive firms (e.g., Armbrüster (2006); Empson (2001); Morris (2001)) 
consultancies  provide external expert knowledge to clients who may be, at least tempo-
rarily, struggling to keep up with current trends and achieve business success (McKenna 
(2006)). The constant stream of innovations that management consultancies produce serves 
their clients, but also positions the consultancies as thought leaders, thus creating continued 
demand for their advice (Ernst and Kieser (2002b, c); Fincham and Clark (2002)).
Studies of management fashions (Abrahamson (1996); Benders and van Veen (2001); 
Kieser (1997); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)) suggest that management consultan-
cies strategically criticize concepts to reshape the market for management knowledge and 
establish their own innovations as sources of commercial success. This self-marketing 
seeks to orient management discourse in a direction that legitimizes specific products 
and processes as rational and effective (Berglund and Werr (2000)). In this view, the rise 
of management consulting is not merely a product of economic needs. It results at least 
in part from the consultancy firms’ rhetorical strategies to shape management discourse, 
develop a reputation as thought leaders, and establish their concepts as appropriate reme-
dies for a range of management problems. 
The centrality of market discourse, reputation, and perceived legitimacy in the marketing 
of consulting services suggests that their competitive success largely feeds on the institu-
tional capital Oliver (1997) held individually by different consultancies as well as collec-
tively by the industry as a whole. Oliver (1997, 709) defines institutional capital “as the 
firm’s capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies” through the “effec-
tive management of the firm’s resource decision context”. In this sense, an organization’s 
institutional capital increases in proportion to its embeddedness in, and active manage-
ment of, its institutional context facilitating the acquisition, creation, and improvement 
of superior resources. Such institutionally contingent resources may include legitimacy, 
reputation, or the client relationships that, in turn, underpin the competitive advantage of 
consultancies. Hence, the strategies for managing the institutional context so as to create 
or sustain institutional capital are vital to consultancy firms’ success.
Since the 1990s, institutional theorists have developed some understanding of how organ-
izations can act strategically within their institutional environments (Oliver (1991)) or 
transform them altogether (DiMaggio (1988); Lawrence (1999); Maguire, Hardy, and 
Lawrence (2004)). Studies on “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio (1988); Green-
wood and Suddaby (2006) have begun to uncover how actors become both motivated and 
enabled to manipulate the very institutional structures that they inhabit. 
The innovative activity of management consultancies has recently been identified as a form 
of institutional entrepreneurship (Walgenbach (2002)). Some studies focus on the role 
of management consultancies as fashion setters who actively create isomorphic pressures 
in their client industries (Kieser (1997); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)). Others inves-
tigate the use of rationality myths in the service delivery processes (Armbrüster (2004); 
Bäcklund and Werr (2001); Berglund and Werr (2000)) or analyze different sociocultural 
and historical influences on the emergence of the consultancy industry (Faust (2002b); 
1 For a review see Garud, Hardy, and Maguire (2007) and Hardy and Maguire (2008). 
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Kipping (2002); Kipping and Armbrüster (2002)). Nonetheless, there are very few explicit 
analyses of the strategies by which consultancy firms may manipulate the institutional 
ramifications of their own existence and operation. 
To address this shortcoming, we examine and classify the strategies by which management 
consultancies can create or sustain their institutional capital. Drawing on strategic approaches 
to institutions (Bresser and Millonig (2003); Lawrence (1999); Oliver (1991)), and illustra-
tive evidence from the German consulting market, we identify a set of five interrelated strat-
egies by which consultancies can manipulate their external environment and enhance their 
competitiveness on the level of the industry, the strategic group, and the individual firm. 
Based on recent discussions by institutionalists addressing embedded (Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006)) and widely distributed (Quack (2007)) agency, we specify the enabling 
conditions and specific nature of these strategies. Hence, we enable a better understanding 
of the strategic repertoire of management consultancies. We also advance institutional 
theory by demonstrating how institutional change is the collective and emergent product 
of distributed actors’ localized efforts to enhance their individual competitive position. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in three parts: In Section 2 we introduce the theo-
retical orientation of the paper. We outline the foundations and recent debates in institutional 
theory and present a repertoire of generic strategies for manipulating institutional environ-
ments. In Section 3 we describe the institutional properties of the management consul-
tancy field and, using illustrative evidence from the German consulting market, explore how 
consultancies can create and sustain their individual and collective institutional capital. In 
Section 4 we develop a classification of consulting-specific institutional strategies, and discuss 
their emergent and distributed nature and the implications for future research. 
2 theoretiCal orientation 
2.1	 Foundations	oF	institutional	theory
In the broadest sense, institutions represent a collective consensus that characterizes a 
social situation. Institutions define the categories and relationships of actors who are 
usually expected to be involved and specify the types of ideas and behaviours that are 
considered acceptable in that situation (DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Meyer and Rowan 
(1977); Meyer and Scott (1983); Powell and DiMaggio (1991)). For business organ-
izations, the institutionalist argument means that they compete for “social as well as 
economic fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 150)), because their survival and success 
depend not only on the technical efficiency, but also the perceived social appropriateness, 
of their ideas, products, structures, and practices. Legitimacy becomes a critical resource 
that organizations must extract from their institutional environment. 
Studies such as those by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Scott (1991), and Scott and 
Meyer (1983)) conceptualize the relevant institutional environment in which legitimacy 
is conferred as an organizational field that represents a midlevel social sphere. In this 
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sphere, those stakeholders that “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institu-
tional life” (DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 149)) evaluate the legitimacy of one anothers’ 
actions and connect concrete organizational action with broader normative and social 
structures. Fields progress from an “emerging” to a “mature” state as their constituents 
interact more frequently and develop shared meaning systems. Emerging fields are still 
relatively underorganized domains. They revolve around a central “issue” such as recy-
cling (Hoffman (1999)), HIV/AIDS treatment (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004)), 
or new technologies (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy (2002)), but their members only 
interact sporadically and unsystematically. Members may recognize some degree of mutual 
interest, but they lack institutional roles with widely shared, clear-cut norms against which 
to evaluate their actions. In contrast, mature fields, such as healthcare (e.g., Brock, Powell, 
and Hinings (1999); Scott et al. (2000)), law (e.g., Empson (2007a); Hoffman (1999)) or 
accounting (e.g., Greenwood, Hinings, and Suddaby (2002); Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006)) are characterized by an established regulatory framework and common meaning 
system. In these fields, constituents are aware of their common enterprise and strati-
fied into clear structures of interorganizational coalition and domination (DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983)). In mature fields, organizations are exposed to strong isomorphic pressures 
that force legitimacy-seeking organizations to comply with the shared rules and norms of 
the field (DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Meyer and Rowan (1977)).
Isomorphism is the dominant concept of early institutionalism, which leads critics to remark 
that it fosters an overly deterministic image of institutions as reified structures to which 
organizations passively adapt. These critiques lead institutionalists to shift their research 
interest from examining processes of isomorphic convergence to exploring the conditions 
and mechanisms producing divergence in organizational forms and behaviours. 
2.2	 institutional	strategy	and	entrepreneurship
DiMaggio’s (1988) foundational argument that “new institutions arise when organized 
actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they 
value highly” (p. 14) reoriented institutionalists’ research towards participants’ efforts to 
actively shape the sociopolitical context of their operations to their advantage. Under 
the label of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio (1988); Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006); Leca, Battilana, and Boxenbaum (2006); Leca and Naccache (2006); Maguire, 
Hardy, and Lawrence (2004)), institutionalists investigate strategies by which self-inter-
ested actors try to establish “a strategically favorable set of conditions” for their organiza-
tion (Lawrence (1999, 167)). 
Oliver (1991) provides a repertoire of strategic responses to existing institutional pressures, 
but Suchman (1995) and Lawrence (1999) suggest more proactive strategies for managing 
organizational legitimacy and shaping the institutional context against which organiza-
tional actions are evaluated. From this previous research, Bresser and Millonig (2003) 
specify five generic manipulation strategies (see Table 1), which institutional entrepreneurs 
might use to shape the rules and norms of their institutional environment according to 
their own interest. 
 ManageMent COnSULtanCieS
SBr 62  July 2010  317-339 321
Table 1: Effects of generic manipulation strategies 
Strategy Effect
Co-optation neutralizing institutional constraints
Lobbyism dismantling/creating of institutional constraints
Membership Creating institutional constraints
Standardization Creating institutional constraints
influence influencing societal value systems
Source:  based on Bresser and Millonig (2003, 235), Oliver (1991, 152), and Lawrence (1999, 168).
Co-optation denotes a strategy of winning over powerful institutional constituents by 
incorporating them into the organization. For example, politicians, trade union repre-
sentatives, or investors may be assigned seats on supervisory or directors’ boards to bring 
them closer to the organization and its interests. This puts co-optation at the manipula-
tive end of Oliver’s (1991) strategy continuum. It aims to neutralize or actively reduce 
external institutional constraints and establish the organization and its actions as legit-
imate. For example, co-opting politicians can create institutional capital insofar as the 
politicians can signal legitimacy, lobby legislative bodies, and facilitate access to lucrative 
government contracts.
Lobbyism is a close relative of co-optation. It describes organizations’ attempts to mobilize 
external institutional actors as advocates of their own interests. However, while co-opta-
tion primarily seeks to reduce institutional pressures on a specific organization, lobbyism 
is a dual-focus strategy: it can be used to reduce constraints on the lobbying organiza-
tion or to increase institutional pressure on its competitors (Oliver (1991); Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978)).
Membership strategies, as originally described by Lawrence (1999), specify which organiza-
tions can legitimately exercise particular functions in a social domain. Organizations that set 
membership rules actively manipulate the system of social positions in their field by deter-
mining the relative ease with which their competitors can enter and access critical resources. 
These rules can be explicit or implicit as, for example, in the professions (Freidson (2001)) 
or keiretsu networks (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi (1992)). However, regardless of their 
nature, membership rules exert normative pressures that organizations must observe if they 
are to become or remain legitimate members of an organizational field. 
Standardization strategies (Lawrence (1999)) aim at establishing specific organizational 
practices, structures, processes, products, or services as legitimate and “normal” within an 
organizational field. Organizations try to portray their own organizational characteris-
tics as appropriate for all members of the organizational field (Greenwood, Hinings, and 
Suddaby (2002)) by invoking technical, legal, regulatory, or more informal norms and 
standards. Establishing its own way of operating as a field-wide standard favours the stan-
dard-setting organization and enhances its institutional capital.
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Influence in Suchman’s (1995) sense is the furthest-reaching strategy that can be used to 
manipulate institutional environments. Influence extends beyond the context of the orga-
nizational field to influence norm systems at the societal level. Organizations that pursue 
this strategy aim to build normative and cognitive legitimacy for particular ideas and 
actions. They reframe an existing social reality within which those ideas and actions that 
suit their organizational interests appear acceptable, even taken for granted. 
However, these strategies, which are directed towards manipulating institutional arrange-
ments at the level of the field or society, raise two important questions. First, how do orga-
nizations become motivated and enabled to act as “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio 
(1988)) and challenge those institutional rules and norms that supposedly define their inter-
ests and scope for strategic action? Second, how do organizational actors succeed in manip-
ulating institutional arrangements that are supported by broad social consensus? These 
questions represent the basic puzzles of institutional theory and have attracted growing 
academic attention under the labels of embedded and, more recently, distributed agency.
2.3	 embedded	and	distributed	agency	
With growing interest in institutional change during the 1990s, the “paradox of embedded 
agency” (Holm (1995); Seo and Creed (2002)), the question of how institutional agents 
bring about change from within their field now constitutes a fundamental puzzle for insti-
tutional theorists.
The institutional entrepreneurship literature focuses primarily on dissatisfied, and therefore 
weakly embedded, actors as potential change agents (Garud and Kumaraswamy (2002); 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996); Greenwood and Suddaby (2006); Lawrence, Hardy, 
and Phillips (2002); Leblebici et al. (1991); Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004)). 
Only recently have institutionalists started to investigate how privileged, firmly embedded 
actors can challenge the very norms from which they benefit and supposedly take for 
granted (Greenwood, Hinings, and Suddaby (2002); Sherer and Lee (2002)). In their 
study of the Big Five accounting firms, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) show how elite 
actors can occupy socioeconomic positions that make them aware of favourable alterna-
tive institutional arrangements, are motivated to further enhance their competitive posi-
tion by pursuing these alternatives, and are largely immune to institutional pressures as 
exerted by, for example, their professional regulators. These insights constitute an impor-
tant step towards disentangling the “paradox of embedded agency”, because they show 
how the perceived underperformance and awareness of preferable arrangements motivate, 
and perceived immunity from institutional sanctions enable, organizations to challenge 
supposedly taken-for-granted institutions. 
At the same time, this stream of work begins to show that institutional change may be 
more collective than the imagery of institutional entrepreneurship may previously have 
suggested. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) focus on the interplay of an elite group of 
firms and their regulator, but Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) highlight the relevance of 
an even wider array of actors in field-wide practice innovation. These authors argue that 
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institutional change may emerge from multiple, distributed actors engaging in parallel, 
but uncoordinated activities that may result in profound field-level change. This perspec-
tive might more realistically describe how institutional strategies play out, and how organ-
izations can enhance or maintain their institutional capital.
3 the organizational field of ManageMent ConsultanCy
Management knowledge is the central “issue” around which the consulting field revolves 
(Engwall and Kipping (2002); Faust (2002a); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)). The crea-
tion, dissemination, and application of new management concepts connects its members 
into a collective endeavor that makes them “interact more frequently and fatefully” (Scott 
(1994, 208)) with each other than with actors outside their “knowledge arena” (Engwall and 
Kipping (2002); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)). Actors who have a stake in the manage-
ment consultancy field include consultancies, their current and potential employees, clients 
in various for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, academic institutions, professional associa-
tions, and the media. Consultants, “management gurus”, and mass media are recognized as 
a “fashion-setting community” that coalesces around the “dramatization of newness” (Faust 
(2002a, 146)) and forms the core of a “recognized area of institutional life” in the sense of 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983, 148) field concept.
Authors describe the management consultancy field in terms that emphasize both the 
emerging and the mature properties. Kipping and Armbrüster (1999) highlight that the 
relatively imprecise nature of the consultancy concept, the multitude of specializations, and 
the frequent change of products and producers complicate the definition of field bound-
aries. Unlike other professional business services such as law or accounting, management 
consulting is not a protected occupation that requires professional certification and accred-
itation (Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006); Kipping and Armbrüster (1999)). 
Industry associations do exist, but they play a largely supporting and representative role, 
contrasting greatly with the formally approved professional associations that regulate the 
practice of lawyers, accountants, and physicians. Industry associations provide opportu-
nities for training and exchange, and they help small management consultancies to build 
credibility and reputation (Clark (1995); Groß and Kieser (2006)). Hence, the isomorphic 
pressures commonly exerted by professional associations or the state are weak in the consul-
tancy field (Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006)). In this sense, the management 
consulting field is still emerging, still providing space for residual institutional ambiguity 
and allowing competing ideas of appropriate consulting practice to coexist.
However, the perceived status of consultancy services and the way in which field constitu-
ents interact with and perceive each other show signs of increasing field maturity. Although 
management consulting is still a relatively young industry, it has positioned itself as “the 
world’s newest profession” (McKenna (2006)), attaining quasi-professional status based 
on the knowledge intensity of its services (Brint (1993); Groß and Kieser (2006); Maister 
(1993)). This perceived professionalization of consultancy services, together with the close 
correlation of professionalization and institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell (1983)), 
suggests that the field has progressed towards fuller institutionalization. Its large growth 
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rates during the 1990s “were being added to a mature frame, not an adolescent skeleton” 
(McKenna (2006, 251)). 
Another indicator of field maturity is the stratification of elites and non-elites, also known 
as central and peripheral field participants, which differ in both scale and reputation 
(Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)). Similar to the more traditional law (Empson (2007a)) 
and accounting professions (Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)), the consulting field is 
clearly stratified along these dimensions, distinguishing a small group of elite organizations 
from their peripheral competitors in both the global and German contexts. 
In 2006, the top ten consultancies in Germany (out of approximately 14,250 incum-
bents) controlled a market share of 18%. With the exception of Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants, a leading national player, the German consulting market is dominated by 
the global elite of American consulting firms such as McKinsey & Company, Booz Allen 
Hamilton, and The Boston Consulting Group. Most of those firms entered the European 
market in the consulting boom of the “golden sixties” (Kipping (1999, 209)) and estab-
lished the significant presence they still enjoy today. 
Hence, while the boundaries of the management consultancy field are relatively fuzzy, its 
center is very clear. The stratification of elite and non-elite organizations, combined with 
the fluidity of field participation, the absence of strong isomorphic pressures, and the 
resultant institutional ambiguity suggest that management consulting is best described as a 
maturing field. Management consultancy is caught in limbo between early emergence and 
full structuration. This trait suggests that the processes of institutionalization are ongoing, 
but that there is still considerable scope for entrepreneurs to shape maturing arrangements 
in ways that enhance their institutional capital.
Even more than in an emerging field, in a maturing field organizations may find partic-
ularly motivating and enabling conditions for strategic action. The lack of institutions of 
professionalism (Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006)) creates institutional ambi-
guity, and therefore weaker institutional constraints. Additionally, local or global elites 
can use their reputations and resourcefulness to shape maturing institutional structures to 
their advantage. The elites’ exposure to top clients and multiple industries also helps them 
influence institutional arrangements (Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)) and give direc-
tion to their institutional strategies. These institutional and organizational conditions act 
as an enabler of strategic action, while the prospect of increased competitive advantage 
and economic reward acts as a motivator. Given that institutional arrangements privi-
lege the interests of their promoters, individual consultancies are motivated to promote 
rules and structures that enhance their institutional capital and competitive advantage. 
These specific institutional conditions suggest that the management consultancy field is 
a particularly rich setting in which to explore strategies for creating and sustaining insti-
tutional capital.
2  Calculations based on (BDU (2007)) and (Lünendonk (2008)).
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4 Creating and sustaining institutional Capital in the ManageMent  
Consulting field
Drawing on generic strategies (see Table 1) by which self-interested actors may impose 
institutional constraints on other field participants (Lawrence (1999)) or relax their own 
(Oliver (1991)), we analyze how consulting firms in Germany manipulate their institu-
tional context to enhance their institutional capital. 
4.1	 co-optation	and	lobbyism
The customization of consultancy services (Fosstenløkken, Løwendahl, and Revang 
(2003)) and the role of networked reputation in acquiring client projects (Glückler 
and Armbrüster (2003)) mean that personal relationships play a strong role in selling 
consultancy services. Marketing measures are often personalized and aimed at forming 
networks with decision-makers in client organizations (Armbrüster and Barchewitz 
(2004)). Thus, the consultancy field is highly susceptible to personalized institutional 
strategies such as co-optation and lobbyism (see Oliver (1991)). In this specific case, 
co-optation may take one of two forms, depending on whether a stakeholder is imported 
into the consultancy or exported to co-opt an external stakeholder “from within”.
Because of the relationship-driven nature of their service, management consultancies focus 
on incorporating employees with existing personal networks into their own business. 
This incorporation is exercised through lateral hires, the hiring of experienced profes-
sionals from competitors (Kaiser (2004); Ringlstetter and Bürger (2004)). Especially when 
firms move into new areas of practice, experienced professionals that bring their personal 
networks of colleagues and clients may provide a crucial boost for business development 
(Malos and Campion (1995)). 
A derivative of co-option that is specific to consultancies and other professional service 
firms is known as outplacement (Maister (1993)), which does not rely on integrating 
important institutional decision-makers into the organization, but on placing loyal 
employees in client organizations or regulatory agencies. For many consulting firms with 
an “up-or-out” tournament promotion system (Galanter and Palay (1991); Gilson and 
Mnookin (1989)) outplacement has become an institutionalized solution to infusing the 
organization with new ideas, but it has “also created a network of former employees who 
served as ambassadors … within other organizations that might otherwise have been wary 
of employing consultants” (McKenna (2006, 208)). The prevalence of the outplacement 
strategy as an instrument for reinforcing consultant-client ties is illustrated by a survey of 
the professional backgrounds of the DAX-30 board members (see Table 2).
3 The DAX-30 lists the 30 largest German companies, publicly listed at Frankfurt stock exchange. It is the equiva-
lent to the FTSE100 in London or the Dow Jones Index in New York. Information on consulting backgrounds 
was gathered from publicly available executive biographies. 
M. reihLen/M. SMetS/a. Veit
  
 SBr 62  July 2010  317-339326
Table 2: Percentage of board members with consulting background of the DAX-30 
corporations in Germany in 2007 
Firms % of board members with 
consulting background
Consulting firms
adidas 50% ernst & Young, gfK
deutsche Post 50% McKinsey
deutsche Postbank 44% McKinsey
deutsche Börse 33%
BCg, Bain, roland Berger*,
anderson Consulting
deutsche Lufthansa 33% BdO
SaP 33% aBP Partners, PwC
Commerzbank 25% BCg, McKinsey
deutsche Bank 25% KPMg
Münchener rückversicherung 25% roland Berger, firm unstated
deutsche telekom 20% Mummert + Partner
daimlerChrysler 17% KPMg
e.On 16% McKinsey
Fresenius 16% McKinsey
henkel 16% KPMg
Continental 14% arthur d. Little
allianz 13% McKinsey
thyssenKrupp 13% PwC
Siemens 9% Kienbaum
BaSF -- --
Bayer -- --
BMW -- --
hypo real estate holding -- --
infineon -- --
Linde -- --
Man -- --
Merck -- --
Metro -- --
rWe -- --
tUi -- --
Volkswagen -- --
Source:  based on datamonitor and publicly available CV information.
* board member with former positions at multiple consulting firms.
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On average, 16% of all DAX-30 board members have a background in management 
consulting. The results ranged from zero to 50%; figures close to 50% suggest close rela-
tionships between the corporation and the consulting field and in some cases with a 
specific consulting firm. Notably, in the chemical or automotive industry, where a strong 
life science or engineering background is desirable even among top executives, only one 
out of 36 board members has a consulting background. Conversely, DAX-30 banks 
recruited one third of their board members from among former management consult-
ants. 
Given our indicator, by far the most successful firm in outplacing former employees into 
client organizations – is McKinsey & Company, the industry leader in the German 
consulting market. Of all former consultants on DAX-30 executive boards, 43% are 
former members of McKinsey. More importantly, in exceptional cases such as the Deut-
sche Post and the Deutsche Postbank, former employees of McKinsey occupy 50% and 
44%, respectively, of the top-management positions. At the same time, McKinsey has 
attained an informal status as “consultancy of choice” for both companies, reducing the 
volume of new business that competitors have been able to acquire. In 2006, McKinsey 
generated an annual fee income of an estimated €80m, accounting for approximately 13% 
of total fee income, from this relationship (Lixenfeld (2008); Student (2008)). Although 
the survey of DAX-30 companies is indicative, the alumni networks of large consultan-
cies reach much further. McKinsey’s German alumni network comprises approximately 
1,800 managers (Reischauer (2005, 86)) compared to about 1,000 former BCG consult-
ants (Student (2006, 32)). 
The prospect of outplacement to prestigious client firms increases the attractiveness on the 
graduate labor market (Reischauer (2005); Student (2006)). It creates institutional capital 
in that it helps attract new talent from leading business schools and fuels the constant 
stream of new entrants that is needed to sustain the up-or-out promotion system. Addi-
tionally, consultants that have successfully been outplaced with clients can help their former 
employer secure a steady stream of new projects, based on good personal relationships 
and information advantages (Bresser and Millonig (2003); McKenna (2006, 203-210)). 
However, the benefit of these client-consultant ties is mutual as clients can also benefit 
from employing former consultants. Their inside knowledge of their former firm makes 
it possible for them to manage service delivery more effectively and to raise performance 
expectations (see Van den Bosch, Baaij, and Volberda (2005)). For instance, former consult-
ants in client organizations may have maintained good personal relationships with partners 
in the consultancy through whom they can sanction low-performing consulting work.
Within New Public Management initiatives, management consultancies are increasingly 
seconding members to government and policy-making committees (Bill and Falk (2006); 
Faust (1998)). A prominent example in Germany is the so-called “Hartz Committee” 
on labor market reform, to which McKinsey and Roland Berger Strategy Consult-
ants seconded senior members. Work on policy-making committees builds reputation, 
but more importantly, it constitutes a deliberate attempt to demonstrate the value of 
4 In the following we refer only to McKinsey.
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consulting services for society. Similar to client outplacements, these temporary second-
ments represent a form of co-optation that enhances consultants’ institutional capital, 
creating public awareness and legitimacy for consulting work in this sector. Such a 
“committee first, then consulting”-strategy (manager-magazin (2004)) opens up the public 
sector as a new and lucrative market for consulting services. In 2004, public organizations 
spent about €1 billon on consulting fees, accounting for approximately 8% of the total 
German consulting market (Falk et al. (2006, 292)).  
However, these efforts to build institutional capital also had unintended consequences 
that reduced it. As new stakeholders surfaced, government watchdogs began to scrutinize 
the government use of management consultancies; journalists and academics publicly 
questioned its legitimacy. The increasing influence of management consultants on polit-
ical decision-making is now met with great skepticism as critics observe the emergence 
of a “republic of consultants” (Leif (2006); Niejahr and Bittner (2004)) in which polit-
ical decision-makers depend increasingly on external consulting expertise. Following a 
resolution of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag, the Federal Audit Office 
(Bundesrechnungshof ) developed guidelines for government relations with, and the use 
of, management consultants (Bundesrechnungshof (2006)). Hence, when some elements 
of the institutional environment, but not others, are co-opted to align with organizational 
interests, unintended consequences for firms’ institutional capital can occur. 
This means that the deliberate competitive or institutional strategies of individual firms 
may entail both positive and negative unintended consequences that drive the developing 
process of institutional change. Deliberate and emergent, and competitive and institu-
tional components of strategy influence each other through feedback loops. For instance, 
the deliberate outplacement of qualified consultants in client organizations solves the 
incentive problems of an up-or-out career system, but also creates an emerging pattern of 
organizational actions that may institutionalize the use of consultancies by clients. Simi-
larly, consultants’ work on policy committees generates fee income and, at the same time, 
creates the incidental by-product that political consulting becomes increasingly indispen-
sable and eventually taken for granted in the public sphere.
4.2	 membership
Membership strategies specify which organizations can legitimately exercise particular 
functions and thus derive benefits resulting from their activity. Nevertheless, in addition 
to Lawrence’s (1999) original conceptualization of membership strategies, we also find 
distinct non-membership strategies among German management consultancies. 
Small and medium-sized consultancies pursue a membership strategy in Lawrence’s (1999) 
sense, in that they organize themselves in industry associations such as the Bundesverband 
Deutscher Unternehmensberater (BDU) or the RKW Beratungsnetzwerk. These associ-
ations, which serve as substitutes for established professional associations with regulatory 
functions, signal a minimum of consultancy competence and quality to potential clients 
(Groß and Kieser (2006)). 
 ManageMent COnSULtanCieS
SBr 62  July 2010  317-339 329
By contrast, for leading international consultancies such membership strategies are coun-
terproductive. In the absence of a protected occupational title and formal professional 
accreditation, reputation serves as a proxy for quality. Hence, elite firms can use their 
reputation as a “membership criterion” and form a strategic group (McGee and Thomas 
(1986)) of management consultancies defined by elite status (Ferguson, Deephouse, and 
Ferguson (2000)). Their rigorous, strict demands serve to maintain the exclusivity of 
their circle and to establish a company-specific “micro-profession”, which is reinforced 
by in-house monitoring of quasi-professional principles (McKenna (2006)). This legit-
imation-qua-reputation gives elite consultancies access to knowledge and policy-making 
arenas in which best practices are created, validated, or diffused (Suddaby and Green-
wood (2001)). 
By steering clear of more inclusive industry associations, elite firms avoid reputational 
contamination and external institutional influence. In this sense, they pursue a non-
membership, or exclusivity, strategy to enhance their individual institutional capital and 
weaken that of their smaller competitors.
4.3	 standardization
Standardization strategies define what is to be seen as normal, for example, for a partic-
ular service. In this respect, membership and standardization strategies are interdependent, 
since both promote and eventually institutionalize consistent standards of professional 
practice and service quality. Those consultancies that promote a standard – and which 
most likely already comply with it – automatically gain legitimacy advantages and enhance 
their institutional capital. 
For instance, in an attempt to strengthen the collective reputation and legitimacy of the 
consulting profession, the BDU filed a request to the Ministry of Economics to protect the 
title Unternehmensberater (management consultant) under occupational law. According to 
the proposal, the title Unternehmensberater should have been awarded conditional upon 
specific credentials, such as academic training or practical experience. But in December 
1997, the proposal was rejected by the ministry (Glückler and Armbrüster (2003, 272); 
Groß and Kieser (2006); Handelsblatt (1997)). 
In accord with their non-membership strategy, elite consultancy firms with a strong posi-
tion in their particular fields can use more subtle standardization strategies to enhance 
their individual, rather than the collective, institutional capital. These consultancies can 
raise to the status of an institution those practices, procedures, and products in which 
they have competitive advantages. In this context, the creation of management fashions 
constitutes a standardization strategy. It at least temporarily institutionalizes concepts or 
5 For instance, McKinsey & Co’s firm-specific network alone, composed of 14,500 active consultants and 18,000 
alumni (McKinsey (2008a)), comprises more members than the BDU representing 530 firms covering 13,000 
individual consultants (BDU (2009)). This network makes it possible for McKinsey to act as a one-firm micro-
profession.
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practices by ascribing to them a value over and above their technical merit (Lawrence 
(1999)). Although fashions are transitory rationality myths and only weakly institution-
alized, nevertheless, while they last they are regarded as standards in their respective areas 
for the duration of their life-cycle. Their technical merit is not evaluated strictly by goal 
attainment, because their application confers benefits of perceived conformity with super-
ordinate norms of rationality and progress (Benders and van Veen (2001); Kieser (1997); 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)).
Consultancies as “expert theorizers” (Strang and Meyer (1993, 498)) occupy privileged 
positions in “reality-defining arenas” (Seo and Creed (2002, 242)) where the legiti-
macy of competing management innovations is constructed and contested. Within these 
arenas, their status enhances the impact and “positive normative emulation” of their ideas 
(Suchman (1995, 579)). Thus, management fashions become important standardization 
devices of socially constructed business solutions. A consultancy that successfully estab-
lishes its own concepts or procedures as temporary standards enhances its own institu-
tional capital, because it develops market preferences that constrain its competitors, which 
are forced to adapt and subscribe to concepts or procedures in which they are at a tech-
nical disadvantage. Further, as the use of specific consulting services becomes a more 
standardized response to certain management problems, the standardization efforts of 
individual firms can build collective institutional capital for the entire industry. 
4.4	 inFluence
Generally, the successful marketing of consultancy services depends on a positive percep-
tion of the engagement of consultants in the target industry. The strategic influence on 
such a fundamental attitude can endow consultancy services with normative, and eventu-
ally cognitive, legitimacy (Suchman (1995); Røvik (2002)).
There is clear evidence that in the past consultancy firms have successfully influenced the 
value systems not only of their clients, but also of society at large, so that the support 
services they provide to management teams and policy makers have become taken for 
granted (Falk et al. (2006); Faust (1998); McKenna (2006); Wimmer (1992)). These obser-
vations resonate strongly with Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) argument that the modernization 
of society makes more areas of society accessible to the rules of rationality. Management 
consultancies have been able to use and propel this trend by reaching out to new groups of 
potential clients and applying their expertise to new types of problems which traditionally 
had not been open to their services (Ernst and Kieser (2002c); Rudolph (2004)). 
Influencing strategies may involve other strategies of institutional manipulation, such as 
outplacement and secondment strategies. However, these strategies may be more wide-
ranging, especially in areas where firms try to influence societal value systems more gener-
ally and open up new markets.
In the business sector, consulting firms can rely on their “systems of persuasion” (Alvesson 
(1993, 1011)) to create institutionalized myths that buffer their existence and operation 
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from questioning. Based on a study of self-presentations by various global management 
consultancies on the Internet, Bäcklund and Werr (2001) conclude that management 
consultancies use prevalent social myths of rationality, globalization, and universality to 
institutionalize their services as necessary components of successful management.
To influence value systems outside their traditional “management” domain, consul-
tancies can employ secondment strategies to demonstrate their value for political deci-
sion-making. Active engagement in social and environmental issues has also become an 
important mission for a large number of businesses that put corporate social responsi-
bility and corporate citizenship high on their agenda. Management consultancies can work 
“pro bono” to display their social responsibility, i.e., deliver services for projects of social 
relevance free of charge (e.g., BCG (2008); McKinsey (2008b); Roland-Berger (2008a)). 
However, these initiatives also provide a strong platform for more wide-ranging societal 
strategies.
From the institutionalist perspective, pro bono work not only builds reputation as a 
socially responsible organization, more importantly, it also creates impressions of ubiq-
uity that may be perceived as an indicator of acceptance and legitimacy. Pro bono work 
gives consultancy firms a legitimate presence in social domains that were previously not 
accessible to them due to incompatible value systems. Especially the large, elite consultan-
cies have developed their status as the new “reflective elite” (Deutschmann (1993); Faust 
(2002a)) or the “supra-experts” (Ernst and Kieser (2002a)) by applying their expertise pro 
bono to societal problems as diverse as climate protection (McKinsey (2007)), restruc-
turing the church (see Hardt (2004); Neidhart (1997)), national innovation systems (BCG 
(2006)), and city attractiveness (Roland-Berger (2008b)). These initiatives counter nega-
tive public perceptions of consultants as hyper-rational cost-cutters. They build a legit-
imate basis of activity for consultancies in a wide range of societal sectors and thereby 
develop the consultancies’ individual and collective institutional capital. Consultancies’ 
individual efforts to manage their reputation collectively drive the institutionalization of 
management consultancy throughout society. 
However, we note that the influencing strategy should not be considered in isolation from 
other, super-ordinate institutional arrangements. For instance, from a historical perspec-
tive, it is clear that the influence of management consultancies in societies with traditional 
values of status, prestige, and authority is lower than in meritocratic societies, which stress 
functional values of effectiveness and efficiency (Faust (2002b)). Therefore, an important 
question is to what extent changes in social values can be influenced by individual insti-
tutional entrepreneurs. 
5 disCussion and ConClusion
Unlike the “classic” professions such as accountancy or law, management consultancy is 
distinguished by institutional ambiguity and weakly entrenched, relatively localized “proto-
institutions” (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips (2002)). Thus, consultancies have an advanta-
geous position in that restrictive institutional pressures are relatively weak, while the relative 
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maturity and stratification of the field has produced a central elite, which enjoys an entre-
preneurial freedom to influence emerging institutions by virtue of their size and reputation. 
Drawing on discussions of institutional capital (Oliver, 1997) and its strategic manipula-
tion (Bresser and Millonig (2003); Lawrence (1999); Oliver (1991)) we have established 
and examined five strategies by which management consultancies can manipulate their 
institutional environment in ways that help them extract competitive resources. Table 3 
summarizes these strategies, the practices through which they are implemented in the 
consultancy field, and the institutional effects they seek to generate. 
Table 3: Strategies of consulting firms for creating and sustaining institutional 
capital
Mutual 
effects 
Strategy Practices of  
consulting firms
Explanation from an 
institutionalist point of view
Co-option/ 
Lobbyism
networking
outplacement
work on committees
°
°
°
institutionalization of firm’s own 
consultancy service
Membership
professional associations,  
professional principles
networks in knowledge  
arenas
exclusive group of major  
management consultancy firms
°
°
°
creating institutional constraints  
for non-members
institutionalization of concepts
circumvention of institutional  
constraints
°
°
°
Standardization standardizing business problems 
and solutions
influencing the knowledge and 
fashion discourses
°
°
(temporary) institutionalization of 
company’s own concepts
Influence
influencing the value  
systems of target industries
use of trends
use of multiplier effects
°
°
°
establishment of a value system  
for one’s own services
Co-optation/lobbyism represents the most effective strategy for management consultan-
cies. This strategy can be used either in isolation or in pursuit of a broader influence 
strategy, and plays a major part in the institutionalization of consultancy services. By 
comparison, the membership and standardization strategies are relatively weak instru-
ments, because membership in industry associations is voluntary and standards may confer 
only temporary advantages before new concepts or practices become fashionable.
Changes in the institutional capital of individual consultancies and the consultancy sector 
as a whole are influenced by a complex interplay of widely dispersed actors, existing 
systems of norms and values, and super-ordinate trends, such as the modernization of 
society. Hence, it is impossible to reduce changes in the societal value system, because 
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they are, for example, necessary to open up non-profit sectors such as politics or envi-
ronmentalism for consulting services, to initiatives of single organizations. As entrepre-
neurs challenge “widely accepted rules of the game” (DiMaggio and Powell (1991, 30)) 
sustained by broad social consensus rather than coercive authorities, they must gradu-
ally mobilize broader sets of actors. Management consultancies can pursue this strategy 
by initially focusing on relevant target industries that they can later use as their advocates 
when trying to manipulate broader societal value systems. A target industry of this kind, 
such as public administration, can be addressed at first by measures focused on one client, 
in anticipation of far-reaching multiplier effects that can eventually lead to a sector- or 
society-wide shift in values.
For the development of institutional theory, our argument has several interrelated impli-
cations: First, our discussion of institutional strategies in the German management 
consultancy field finds that instititutional entrepreneurs take less a voluntaristic role than 
previous accounts have suggested. The combined presence of multiple actors, such as 
consulting firms, the media, clients, business schools, and industry associations, with 
different levels of involvement implies that agency is distributed across actors. There is 
typically no centralized control in the consulting field, since there is no single agency 
with a monopoly power position that can dictate the behaviour of other agents. Hence, 
collective behaviour has to be understood as the result of self-organized actors interacting 
with their local environment, but creating global patterns of action as a by-product. For 
example, the creation of management fashions cannot be understood as an individual 
endeavor, but as the collective achievement of non-orchestrated, widely distributed agents 
that resemble a social movement. This understanding of institutional change initiatives as 
distributed agency (Garud and Karnøe (2003); Quack (2007)) rather than individualistic 
entrepreneurship sheds new light on institutional strategy formation.
Second, with multiple localized actors contributing to an institutional change, the forma-
tion of institutional strategies may be better understood as an interplay of emergent and 
deliberate actions. As Mintzberg (1987a; 1987b) suggests, strategies need not be deliberate; 
they can also emerge from incremental and wide-spread patterns of actions. Although these 
approaches have generally been viewed as mutually exclusive opposites, Quack (2007) finds 
that institution building involves both practitioners’ practical problem-solving and firms’ 
deliberate political interventions. It appears that in our accounts, institutional strategies are 
the result of a complex interplay between deliberate sets of actions that individual consulting 
firms use to enhance their competitive positions, and emerging patterns of collective actions 
that produce institutional change through complex feedback loops with other players in the 
field. For instance, by deliberately outplacing loyal consultants in client organizations, close 
business relations may evolve into unquestioned institutionalized work practices between 
the two organizations. Furthermore, a consulting firm’s participation in political committees 
is usually a deliberate attempt to enhance revenues, but can also build firm-specific institu-
tional capital by enhancing reputation. Beyond that, industry-specific institutional capital 
emerges as political consulting becomes legitimized as a new field of activity.
There is a great potential for future research along these lines in the continued devel-
opment of an institutionalist theory of management consultancy. Our own contribu-
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tion should be understood as a first theoretical step in this direction. Further empirical 
research should be pursued to analyze different strategies for building up institutional 
capital, to uncover differences between different strategic groups of management consul-
tancy firms, and to identify the constituent forms of institutional work (Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006)) that are used in specific institutional contexts. 
Insights from such an empirical study would also inform institutionalist theory on 
maturing fields. Such a study is intrinsically interesting, because it would allow institu-
tionalists to understand the gradual structuration of fields through a “cumulative history 
of action and interaction” (Barley and Tolbert (1997, 98)). Evidently, the consultancy 
field provides an instrumental, abundant setting for exploring the motivations, abilities, 
and activities of institutional agents creating and modifying institutional arrangements. 
Hence, a better understanding of their strategies and the institutional conditions under 
which they are to be employed will help produce a better institutional theory of consul-
tancy firms and their institutional capital, and also offer practical advice about strategies 
to strategically enhance and maintain it.
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